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Abstract 
The impact of software on human interactions is ever increasing. However, software 
developers are often unaware of statutory provisions that regulate human interactions. 
As a consequence, software is increasingly coming into conflict with such provisions. 
Therefore, this paper contributes an approach for advising the developer in designing 
software  that  complies  to  statutory  provisions.  The  approach  relies  on  the  
formalisation of statutory provisions and semi-automated legal reasoning assisted by 
the developer. 
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Software increasingly mediates human interactions by regulating actions in web-
shops, social networks, or eGovernment. As a response, legislation lays out detailed 
provisions in specific areas, e.g., the Federal Data Protection Act (FDPA) or 
Telemedia Act (TMA) in Germany. Such provisions comprise legal requirements 
including those for software. 
The provisions, however are often not conveyed to the addressees, namely, the 
software developers. In larger software development projects, e.g., when 
professionally developing comprehensive enterprise applications, the developer either 
has to painstakingly follow “product guidelines” as part of a strictly defined software 
engineering process, or a legal expert has to be consulted. In the first case, the 
guidelines are typically generic, rigid and limited to specific acts, such as Sarbanes-
Oxley.1 In the second case, the legal expert has to assess the given software, which 
requires a “translation” from the software domain to the legal domain. During this 
“translation” aspects might be lost or misinterpreted. 
In smaller development projects, such as rapid prototyping of mobile apps, the 
software can be developed rather quickly and effortlessly, even by a single younger 
programmer, who would be less likely to be aware of legal requirements on software.  
Even in the unlikely case that the programmer is aware of all relevant statutory 
provisions, he or she is typically unable to determine and interpret the “legal norms” 
(typically represented by a paragraph, section or sentence in a provision). In addition, 
the assessment of compliance to legislation cannot always be given in advance 
because Internet-based, cloud and mobile apps are often mashed-up with other apps. 
This newly created mash-up might result in a different legal assessment than its 
individual parts. 
In all cases, a proper assessment requires in-depth legal reasoning which is a complex 
intellectual process, so far only executable manually by experienced legal experts. 
Somewhat simplified, the legal expert – most likely by experience – has some idea of 
the legal consequence he or she wishes to attain. This, in turn, determines a limited set 
of norms from which to start. Each of these norms must be inspected in order to 
determine whether the given situation matches the state of affairs required for the 
norm to be applicable. This may in turn require the legal expert to look for norms in 
other  statutory  provisions  and  so  on.  The  legal  expert  mentally  constructs  a  “norm  
graph” that enables him to decide whether the originally intended legal consequence 
can be reached or not. As depicted in Figure 1, a norm graph consists of legal 
concepts (represented by nodes) and links between them (represented by arrows). 
 
 
                                               
1  I Zhang, “Economic consequences of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002” (2007) 44 Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 74-115. 




Figure 1 : Norm graph for the legal consequence of “Lawfulness” in the Sec. 4 (1) FDPA.  
 
We claim that a technology-supported framework must be established to convey and 
manifest legal requirements in the software as early as possible. Since software 
developers are usually legal laymen, this paper contributes an automated approach for 
advising developers about legal reasoning.2 This support is integrated in the develop-
ment environment of the software developer.  
 
 
Figure 2 : Overview of our approach and outline of this paper. 
                                               
2 There are a number of legal philosophies that try to explicate the legal reasoning process. For the 
German legal system see, e.g., S Ring, Computergestützte Rechtsfindungssysteme, Voraussetzungen, 
Grenzen und Perspektiven, (Köln, Berlin, Bonn, München: Heymanns, 1994). Our approach is based 
on K Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 6th ed (Berlin Heidelberg New York: Springer, 
1991). 
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The wizard is based on the formalisation of the norm graph as depicted in Figure 2. A 
legal expert is required for capturing both the semantics of legal concepts as well as 
the rule-like nature of legal norms and their relationships. Another prerequisite is the 
formalisation of the subject matter, namely, software and its environment. This is the 
task of a domain expert. The semi-automation of the legal reasoning process then 
happens within an integrated software development environment based on a given 
software, and requiring the interaction of the developer. Finally, the developer is 
advised in “translating” and manifesting individual consequences in the software. 
2. Motivating Scenario 
The following section introduces a motivating scenario as a running example 
throughout this paper. In this scenario, we present a manual legal reasoning process 
that reveals violations of the FDPA. Understanding the manual legal reasoning 
process facilitates the understanding of our automated approach in Sections 3 to 6. 
Our automated approach avoids such violations during the development phase of the 
software. 
2.1. Setting 
For our motivating scenario, we limit ourselves to the German data privacy law. Data 
privacy law has a small number of legal consequences that can be checked. Note, 
however, that our approach is independent of a particular field of law.  
The motivating scenario concerns the fictitious company, “KnowWhere,” that offers a 
“person locator app.” This application can be used to track the location of a user who 
has installed the app on his smartphone. For instance, private customers can use the 
app to obtain information about the location of their Facebook friends. 
As depicted in Figure 3, the person locator app accesses the GPS module of the 
smartphone and sends the coordinates and a specific Facebook ID to the server 
application. The server updates the corresponding database entry which also 
comprises additional information about the person. For obtaining and displaying 
maps, KnowWhere relies on Google Maps, a service provided by the Google 
Corporation. Interesting points and locations, defined by GPS coordinates, can be 
highlighted on a map and marked with the Facebook ID.  
Furthermore, KnowWhere offers the “person locator portal” showing maps with the 
positions of all users that belong to a specified group. The user has to identify himself 
and specify a group-ID. The server collects all user locations that belong to the given 
group and uses Google Maps to highlight their positions on the map. 
 




Figure 3 : A violation of the German FDPA. 
 
 
In the following subsection 2.2, we present a manual legal reasoning process which 
shows how the  software  violates  the  privacy  law by  using  Google  Maps  to  pinpoint  
the Facebook friends of the user. 
2.2. Manual Legal Reasoning 
The first step of the manual legal reasoning process is to check whether the FDPA is 
applicable at all. 
Question 1: Which provision is applicable? 
The FDPA defines its scope at the beginning in:  
[Sec 1 (2) FDPA – Purpose and scope: This Act shall apply to the 
collection, processing and use of personal data by … private 
bodies.]  
KnowWhere, a “private body” as  described  by  Sec.  2  (4)  of  the  FDPA,  discloses  
Facebook IDs and geo coordinates to other parties, namely, Google Corporation. That 
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would qualify as either a “transfer” of data (according to Sec. 3 (4) No. 3 of the 
FDPA) or as “use” of data (according to Sec. 3 (5) of the FDPA).  
Therefore, it has to be checked whether the data can be classified as personal:   
[Sec.  3  (1)  FDPA  –  Further  definitions: “Personal data” shall 
mean any information concerning the personal or material 
circumstances of an identified or identifiable natural person (“data 
subject”).] 
Both the user and his friends are “natural persons.” Facebook IDs can be identifying 
information, especially if the IDs feature the full name. In most cases, it takes only 
modest effort to “identify” the person behind the Facebook IDs. The geo coordinates 
attributed to the IDs provide further information about the “personal circumstances” 
of the users. Hence, most Facebook IDs and the additional geo data associated with 
the ID would be classified as “personal data” according to Sec. 3 (1) of the FDPA.  
According to Sec. 1 (3) S. 1, the FDPA shall only be applicable if the case at hand is 
not covered by special legal provisions on data privacy in another legal act. 
Concerning data handling by private bodies, Sec. 91-107 of the German 
Telecommunications Act (TCA) and Sec. 11-15a of the German Telemedia Act 
(TMA) are most relevant. 
The TCA contains special  data privacy provisions solely for the handling of data by 
providers of “telecommunication services” as defined in Sec. 3 No. 24. As 
KnowWhere does not maintain telecommunication infrastructure itself, the TCA is 
not applicable. Yet, the portal provided by KnowWhere falls within the definition of 
“Telemedia” in Sec. 1 (1) of the TMA. Whether the data privacy norms in Sec. 11-15a 
of the TMA overrule the provisions of the FDPA depends on the type of data handled 
by the telemedia provider. The TMA only covers “inventory data” as defined in Sec. 
14 and “usage data” as defined in Sec. 15. The Facebook IDs and the GPS data 
disclosed by KnowWhere are neither necessary for establishing the contractual 
relationship with the users, nor for submitting, or invoicing the usage of the portal. 
KnowWhere does not identify its users by their Facebook IDs, but by their telephone 
connection. Also, providing GPS data is not necessary to use the personal locator 
portal as such, but only to enhance its functionalities. Hence, these types of data do 
not fall under the regime of the TMA. 
As a result, the FDPA is applicable.  
Question 2: Is the disclosure of user data to Google lawful? 
The next step is to check for lawfulness according to:  
 
[Sec. 4 (1) FDPA – Lawfulness of data collection, processing and 
use: The collection, processing and use of personal data shall be 
lawful only if permitted or ordered by this Act or other law, or if the 
data subject provided consent.] 
 
As shown above, the disclosure of Facebook IDs and geo coordinates to Google is 
either to be qualified as “transfer” that is “processing of data” (Sec. 3 (4) of the 
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FDPA), or “use of data.” Therefore, lawfulness requires either the “permission or 
order by this Act or other law”, or that the “data subject provided consent.” 
Question 2.1: Is permission or order by this Act or other law provided? 
Part III of the FDPA contains the provisions applicable for private bodies (compare 
Sec. 27 of the FDPA). Therefore, a legal norm for permission has to be primarily 
sought in this part. Upon close inspection we find: 
[Sec. 28 (1) S. 1 No. 1 FDPA – Collection and recording of data 
for one's own commercial purposes: The collection, recording, 
alteration or transfer of personal data or their use as a means to 
pursue one's own commercial purposes shall be lawful if necessary 
to create, perform or terminate a legal obligation or quasi-legal 
obligation with the data subject, …]  
Sec. 28 of the FDPA is applicable only for the handling of data for one’s “own 
commercial purposes.” KnowWhere discloses the data to Google in order to be able to 
provide information about the location of participants and, thus, fulfills the obligation 
it accepted in the course of providing the app for the users. As this is KnowWhere’s 
“own commercial purpose,” Sec. 28 of the FDPA is a suitable permission norm. 
Sec. 28 (1) S. 1 No. 1 of the FDPA covers “collection, recording, alteration or 
transfer” of personal data. According to Sec. 3 (4) No. 3 of the FDPA, disclosure to a 
“third party” falls  within the definition of transfer.  According to Sec 3 (8) S.  2,  3 of 
the FDPA, a third party is any party other than the controller of private data to whom 
the FDPA is being applied, in this case KnowWhere, (Sec. 3 (7) of the FDPA) but 
excluding the persons who are the subjects of the data, and also excluding any parties 
acting “on behalf of” the data controller. The question is whether Google is a third 
party, or whether it acts on behalf of the data controller, KnowWhere, as defined in 
Sec. 11 of the FDPA.  
Sec. 11 of the FDPA lists a variety of requirements ensuring that the data controller is 
able to monitor and control every step of data handling. KnowWhere has neither 
negotiated contractual requirements with Google, nor is it able to control or monitor 
Google’s  handling  of  data.  Hence,  Google  does  not  handle  the  data  on  behalf  of  
KnowWhere. Rather, Google handles the data on its own behalf (Sec. 3 (7) of the 
FDPA). Therefore, Google is a “third party” as  defined  in  Sec.  3  (4)  No.  3  of  the  
FDPA. Therefore, the disclosure of the Facebook IDs and geo coordinates of the 
user’s friends is an act of “transfer.” 
The next question is whether the transfer is “necessary” for KnowWhere “to create, 
perform or terminate a (quasi-)legal obligation with the data subjects.” As a key 
function of the person locator app, KnowWhere promises to provide a service that  
monitors the current location of the user’s friends. Even if KnowWhere is not willing 
to incur contractual obligations, this relationship can at least be qualified as quasi-
legal. Thus, the key question is whether the transfer of the Facebook IDs and the geo 
coordinates to Google is “necessary” to perform the obligation of monitoring the 
users’ locations. This criterion is two-fold: on the one hand, the processing of data as 
such is only necessary if the contractual performance cannot be delivered without it in 
an appropriate way. On the other hand, the data controller has to restrict the amount of 
processed data to the necessary minimum. 
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KnowWhere is not reliant on the visual interface of Google Maps in order to monitor 
current locations. Even if it was, it could use the freely accessible Google Maps data 
and mark the locations by itself. If KnowWhere still wanted to involve Google in the 
data provision, it would be sufficient to transfer anonymised or aliased data. All in all, 
the transfer of the Facebook IDs and geo data to Google is not “necessary” in the 
sense of Sec. 28 (1) S.1 No. 1 of the FDPA. Thus, the data transfer cannot be justified 
by this provision.  
Other statutory provisions that permit or order the transfer are not apparent. In 
particular, the transfer cannot be legitimated by Sec. 28 (1) S.1 No. 2 FDPA, because 
there is an overriding interest of the app users in not having data as sensitive as their 
current location transferred to third parties. Therefore, there is no law “permitting or 
ordering” the data handling by KnowWhere. 
Question 2.2: Has the data subject provided consent? 
Proceeding to the second alternative of Sec. 4 (1) of the FDPA, a lawyer would check 
for “consent” provided by the data subjects. Operating systems generically ask the 
user during installation of an app for access to the smartphone’s resources such as the 
GPS module. An affirmative response would count as a declaration of consent. In 
order to function as effective consent, declarations would have to fulfill the conditions 
of:   
[Sec. 4a (1) FDPA – Effective Consent: Consent shall be effective 
only when based on the data subject’s free decision. Data subjects 
shall be informed of the purpose of collection, processing or use 
and, as necessary in the individual case, or on request, of the 
consequences of withholding consent. …] 
Due to the generic nature of such questions (“May the app use the GPS module?”), 
the user is not appropriately informed about the purpose of the collection, processing, 
and use of his personal data. In particular, the users are not informed about the 
transfer of personal data from KnowWhere to Google. Therefore, effective consent is 
not given. 
Result 
As a result, the data transfer from KnowWhere to Google can neither be justified by 
law nor by consent. Therefore, according to Sec. 4 (1) of the FDPA, the conduct of 
KnowWhere violates data privacy law. 
3. Formalisation of the Norm Graph 
The prerequisite for applying our approach of engineering compliant software, and, 
thus,  to  prevent  violations  such  as  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  is  the  
formalisation  of  the  norm  graph.  It  is  the  task  of  a  legal  expert  to  capture  both  the  
semantics of legal concepts (Section 3.1) as well as the rule-like nature of legal norms 
and their  relationships (Section 3.2).  Both can be captured by means of an ontology. 
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An ontology is a conceptual, i.e., user-targeted, data model that relies on formal 
logic.3  
In the following section we sketch how a “statutory ontology” is built.  According to 
our motivating scenario, we build a “data privacy ontology for private bodies” which 
requires the formalisation of the German FDPA Part III as well as parts of the more 
special German Telemedia (Sec. 1, 11-15a) and Telecommunications Acts (Part VII, 
Chapter 2).  
3.1. Formalisation of Legal Concepts 
Automatic preprocessing (3.1.1) supports the legal expert in extracting the required 
vocabulary out of a legal text, e.g., the German FDPA, as a starting point for 
formalising legal concepts. The vocabulary forms the basis of a lexicon which 
complements extracted terms by additional information (3.1.2). In turn, the lexicon 
serves  as  a  basis  for  creating  classes  and  relations  of  the  ontology  (3.1.3).  Legal  
concepts are eventually represented by a class, as well as relations to other classes, 
that capture the legal concept’s definition. 
3.1.1. Automatic Preprocessing 
Automatic preprocessing aims at decreasing the word pool of a legal text to the 
necessary minimum. The input is represented by a legal text in electronic form, such 
as the FDPA on the Web, and the output is a list of candidate words for formalisation 
of legal concepts, e.g., “personal data.”  Automatic preprocessing applies 
 Filtering:  The  word  pool  of  a  legal  text  is  reduced  to  words  with  relevant  
meaning. Stop-words,4 such as “and,” are eliminated and stemming5 reduces 
declined verbs to their corresponding noun. For example, “processes” and 
“processed” are reduced to the noun “processing.” 
 Identification of Relationships: Words that frequently occur together and have 
a semantic relationship are identified.6 For example, the words “personal” and 
“data” frequently occur together and, thus, are likely to be considered as one 
concept: “personal data.” 
3.1.2. Creating the Lexicon 
While the pre-processing is done automatically, creating the lexicon is a manual 
endeavour. The purpose of building a lexicon is to enrich the extracted terms with 
                                               
3 N Guarino, D Oberle and S Staab, “What is an Ontology?” in S Staab and R Studer (eds), Handbook 
on Ontologies, 3rd ed. (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2009) 1-17. 
4 H Luhn, “The Automatic Creation of Literature Abstracts” (1958) 2(2) IBM Journal of Research and 
Development 159–165. 
5  M Porter, “An Algorithm for Suffix Stripping” (1980) 14(3) Program: electronic library and 
information systems 130–137. 
6 H Ahonen-Myka, “Discovery of Frequent Word Sequences in Text” in D Hand, N Adams and R 
Bolton (eds), Pattern Detection and Discovery (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2002) 319–328. 
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additional information required for building the ontology in the subsequent step.7 
Besides the term itself, the legal expert is prompted to fill in lexicon entries with 
fields such as “definition,” “relations to other terms,” “classification,” “commentary,” 
“layman explanation” and “questions” or links to “external sources,” etc. An example 
entry for the legal concept “personal data” is shown in Figure 5 (left side). 
3.1.3. Classes and Relations 
Each lexicon entry represents a legal concept that now has to be formalised by a 
“class.” A class in an ontology represents all instances with common characteristics. 
For example, the class Physical Object represents all instances that are 
tangible.8 Common characteristics are expressed by “relations” to other classes. For 
example, a Physical Object might feature a relation hasWeight, which 
points to a Physical Quality such as Kilograms. The super-/subclass relation 
(also called “specialisation”) holds a special place in an ontology since it puts classes 
into a “taxonomy.” For instance, the class Natural Person is a subclass of 
Physical Object, because the first carries all characteristics of the latter and 
adds special characteristics, such as hasAge. 
In a first step, the legal expert has to put classes into a taxonomy. In order to support 
this intellectual process, a foundational ontology can be used as a sound starting point 
by prescribing basic classes of human cognition.9 First, the class Object denotes all 
instances that are always present with all  their  essential  parts at  a given time, e.g.,  a 
Natural Person. Second, characteristics, such as the Age of  a  person,  are  
specialised from the class Quality. Third, Processes are instances that have 
temporal parts, e.g., the Processing of data. Last, Abstract denotes instances 
that do not have extension in space and time, e.g., the number 5. 
By specialising legal concepts, i.e., their corresponding classes, from the correct class 
of the foundational ontology, the intended meaning can be captured. For example, the 
concept “collection” can refer both to an Object (a set of items) and an Event (the 
intended meaning in the case of the FDPA). The resulting specialisation is shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
                                               
7 Our approach for building a lexicon as intermediate step for an ontology rests on K Breitman and J 
Sampaio do Prado Leite, “Lexicon Based Ontology Construction” in C Lucenaet al (eds), Software 
Engineering for Multi-Agent Systems II (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2004) 19–34. 
8 Classes and relations are written in fix-width font in the following. 
9 Our approach rests on the foundational ontology called DOLCE (see A Gangemi et al “Sweetening 
Ontologies with DOLCE” in A Gómez-Pérez and V Benjamins (eds), Knowledge Engineering and 
Knowledge Management. Ontologies and the Semantic Web, 13th International Conference, EKAW 
2002, Siguenza, Spain, October 1-4, 2002, Proceedings (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2002) 166-181. 




Figure 4 : Specialising classes from the foundational ontology. 
 
After creating the taxonomy, the legal expert has to establish relations between 
classes. Hints for relations are contained in the lexicon entries “definition” and 
“relations  to  other  terms.”  Similar  to  prescribing  a  basic  set  of  classes,  the  
foundational ontology also prescribes generic relations, such as partOf, which can 
be used as a starting point.  
As with all other steps, creating relations is supported by an intuitive graphical user 
interface especially designed for the legal expert who usually is no expert in ontology 
engineering. Figure 5 shows the design for a user interface where the left side depicts 
the current lexicon entry of the term to be formalised (“personal data”). The right side 
allows for choosing from a catalogue of established ontology design patterns. In this 
particular case, the Information Object design pattern can be instantiated to capture 
the required relations for Personal Data.10 
                                               
10  Ontology design patterns are templates for reoccurring modelling needs (see V Presutti and A 
Gangemi, Content Ontology Design Patterns as Practical Building Blocks for Web Ontologies  in Q Li 
et al (eds)  Conceptual Modeling - ER 2008, 27th International Conference on Conceptual Modeling, 
Barcelona, Spain, October 20-24, 2008. Proceedings (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2008) 128-141 and 
A Nitin et al, “Information Object Design Pattern for Modeling Domain Specific Knowledge” in 
Proceedings of the 1st ECOOP Workshop on Domain-Specific Program Development (DSPD), 
(2006)). 
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Figure 5 : User interface design for capturing relations. 
 
3.2. Legal Norms 
Capturing legal concepts in a statutory ontology is also the prerequisite for capturing 
the rule-like structure of legal norms, and thus, the norm graph. Since ontology 
languages blend conceptual modeling capabilities with the possibility for expressing 
logical rules, both formalised legal concepts and formalised legal norms can be 
captured in the same formalism.11  
3.2.1. Individual Norms 
Typically, legal norms determine a “legal consequence” (LC), given one or more 
“state of affairs” (“SF”), which fall within the scope of the norm. Schematically, this 
can be expressed in an ontology language as a logical “rule” as follows: 
 
SF  LC        (1) 
 
This is to be read as: “when state of affairs (SF) is given, then the legal consequence 
(LC) applies.” Both SF and LC usually consist of several parts, i.e., there are several 
states of affairs required to derive one or more legal consequences: 
 
SF1, SF2, … SFn    LC1, LC2, … LCm    (2) 
 
                                               
11 In our case, we apply the logic programming dialect called F-Logic, see M Kifer, G Lausen and J 
Wu, “Logical Foundations of Object-Oriented and Frame-Based Languages” (1995) 42(4) Journal of 
the ACM 741-843. 
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However, for computational reasons, ontology languages constrain the structure of 
such logical rules to one consequence only. Thus, the first intellectual task of the legal 
expert is to decompose each norm into the following scheme: 
 
SF1, SF2, … SFn    LC1 
SF1, SF2, … SFn    LC2 
 …        (3) 
SF1, SF2, … SFn    LCm     
 
In the example of Sec. 4 (1) of the FDPA (see Section 2.2), the word “only” indicates 
that there are indeed two LCs that must be handled and formalised individually:    
 The collection, processing and use of personal data is lawful if permitted or 
ordered by this Act or other law, or the data subject consented; and 
 The collection, processing and use of personal data is unlawful if neither 
ordered by this Act or other law, nor prescribed by this Act, nor consented to 
by the data subject  
The  next  intellectual  task  for  the  legal  expert  is  to  replace  each  SF  and  LC  by  
elements of the ontology. In a first step, this is achieved by identifying relevant 
classes. In the example, the SFs are replaced by the following classes: Collection, 
Processing, Use, Personal Data, Permission, Order, Data Subject, 
and Consent. LC is replaced by Lawfulness. 
In a second step, explicit links between the chosen classes are inserted by means of 
relations. The legal norm typically contains indications for such explicit links, e.g., 
Sec. 4 (1) of the FDPA contains the phrase “use of personal data,” which requires the 
insertion of a performedUpon relation between Use and Personal Data. 
In a third step, the legal expert checks for implicit links which are not directly 
mentioned in the legal norm but are mentally complemented by the interpreter. For 
example, there exists an implicit link between Consent and the Collection, 
Processing and Use. Namely, it is the consent that permits such actions. 
Finally, the inserted elements of the ontology are logically combined (in formulae 1-3 
this is represented schematically by the “,”). Ontology languages offer bracketing as 
well as logical operators (AND, OR) for this purpose. As an example, Sec. 4 (1) of the 
FDPA entailing lawfulness is formalised as follows 
 
      ((Collection(X) OR Processing(X) OR Use(X))   
     AND performedUpon(X,Y) AND Personal Data(Y)) 
               AND 
  (Permission(P) OR Order(P)) AND givenFor(P,X))) 
  OR      (4) 
    (Consent(C) AND Data Subject(D) AND about(Y,D) 
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   AND gives(D,C) AND permits(C,X)) 
       
                   Lawfulness(A) AND givenFor(A,X) 
 
X, Y, P, C, D, and A are “variables” that stand for instances of the corresponding class 
or relation. Their names can be chosen arbitrarily. An expression such as Data 
Subject(D) can be read as a sentence with an unknown part labeled as D: “D is a 
data subject.” In turn, D can be bound to a concrete instance, e.g., to the user Daniel. 
3.2.2. Integration of Several Norms 
Legal norms have complex interrelationships that feed back into the formalisation of 
an individual norm. First, two or more legal norms might have overlapping SFs that 
lead to different LCs depending on whether they are given or not. An example for this 
case has been discussed at the beginning of Section 3.2.1. This case can be solved by 
negating the overlapping SFs via the NOT operator as follows: 
 
SF1, SF2, …       (…  SFn)    LC1    (5) 
SF1, SF2, …NOT  (… SFn)    LC2 
 
Second, a legal norm might be an explicit exception to another legal norm. In this 
case, both norms must be rewritten as shown in formula (6). The occurrence of SF in 
both norms indicates that overlapping states of affairs might be given at the same 
time. 
 
SF1, SF2, … OR   SFException     LC    (6) 
        SF1, SF3, …       SFException    
 
As an example,  consider Sec.  4a (1) of the FDPA, which requires consent in written 
form unless there is an exception. One exception is mentioned in the same norm 
(special circumstances). However, there might also be exceptions in other provisions, 
e.g.,  Sec.  13  (2)  of  the  TMA,  which  lists  requirements  for  the  use  of  an  electronic  
form in the case of Telemedia services. This situation is formalised as sketched in 
formulae (7) – (9). 
 
[Sec 4a (1) FDPA – Effective Consent: … Consent shall be given in 
writing unless special circumstances warrant any other form. …] 
 
(Consent(C) AND givenIn(C,F)  
AND WrittenForm(F)) OR Exception(F) 
AND ...        (7) 
Effectiveness(E) AND givenFor(E,C) 




SpecialCircumstances(SC) AND  
warrants(SC,F) AND OtherForm(F)  (8) 
                                               Exception(F) 
 
ElectronicForm(F) AND Provider(P)  
 AND assures(P,U) AND ...     (9) 
                                                          Exception(F) 
 
The third case is an implicit exception between legal norms with contradicting 
consequences, e.g., when one norm takes precedence over the other due to lex 
specialis derogat legi generali. When just considering the text, this leads to logical 
rules that both overlap in their SFs and lead to conflicting LCs: 
 
SF1, SF2, …    LC       (10) 
SF1, SF3, …       NOT LC    
 
A possible solution for resolving the conflict is to rewrite both rules according to the 
scheme depicted in (6), i.e., as an explicit exception. 
4. Formalisation of the Subject Matter 
The subject matter has to be formalised as completely as possible for automated 
processing. This is also a prerequisite before being able to advise the developer in a 
software development environment. Fortunately, in our case, a major part of the 
subject matter is already inherent in the software. It is more a matter of representing 
this information suitably, such that an automated processing is facilitated.  
The  following  section  presents  a  suitable  way  for  formalisation  by  means  of  a  
“subject matter ontology.” Here it is important to point out that an ontology consists 
of a schema and instances. The schema (further discussed in Section 4.1) formalises 
relevant classes, such as “software” or “data,” and puts them in relation. The schema 
has to be manually designed only once by a domain expert. Instances of such classes 
then represent a specific subject matter (further discussed in Section 4.2). These 
instances can be obtained automatically from the software. 
Using the same ontology language and also the same foundational ontology facilitates 
finding correlations with the statutory ontology during the legal reasoning process in 
Section 5. 
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4.1. Subject Matter Schema 
It is the task of a domain expert to build the schema, i.e., to identify relevant classes 
and relations to represent common concepts in the realm of software.12 Therefore, the 
schema is independent of a specific subject matter such as the one outlined in the 
scenario. Figure 6 shows a small excerpt of the ontology’s major classes, e.g., Data, 
Software, or Invocation. They are aligned under, i.e. specialised from, the 
(grey) classes of a foundational ontology.  
 
Figure 6 : Snippet of the subject matter ontology’s schema. 
 
Figure 6 only shows super-/subclass relations (specialisation). However, each class 
can have an arbitrary number of relations with different semantics. It is an intellectual 
and manual task of the domain expert to identify and model such relevant relations. 
Figure 7 shows some examples for arbitrary relations around the class Web 
Service. A Web service is an application programming interface whose 
functionality  can  be  utilised  (“invoked”)  by  using  Web protocols,  such  as  HTTP.  A 
piece of Software, e.g., a software component, performs a Web Service 
Operation Invocation. Each invocation targets a Web Service 
Operation, which in turn is partOf a Web Service. Invocations request 
and respond with Data that is representedBy an XML document and about 
some Entity. 
 
                                               
12 The Ontology of UIs and Interactions (see H Paulheim, Ontology-based Application Integration 
(Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer), at ch 6) is reused for this purpose which builds on the Core Software 
Ontology (see D Oberle et al, “Towards Ontologies for Formalizing Modularization and 
Communication in large Software Systems” (2006) 1(2) Applied Ontology 163-202. Both ontologies 
are based on the foundational ontology DOLCE. 
Entity
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Figure 7 : Representing invocations in the subject matter ontology. 
 
4.2. Subject Matter Instances 
While the schema of the subject matter ontology only captures relevant concepts in 
form of classes and relations, it is the instances that represent a specific subject matter 
depending on a given software. That means the schema does not change but rather the 
instances depend on the actual subject matter. Instances are concrete elements of 
classes that have relations to other instances according to the schema. For example, an 
instance WSOpI1 of class Web Service Operation Invocation might 
represent the transfer data to Google Maps in our scenario. In contrast to the schema, 
the instances are obtained automatically in different ways, as discussed in the 
following section. 
4.2.1. Automatic Extraction of Instances 
Most of the relevant instances are inherent in the code or accompanying descriptors 
and are extracted automatically. Concrete instances for automatic extraction from the 
software in the subject matter ontology have multiple sources. One primary source is 
integrated software development environments that keep track of software 
components and their interdependencies. In addition, software visualisation tools13 
perform a more in-depth analysis of invocations for better understanding complex 
software. This information is leveraged for our purposes. Another source is descriptor 
files, typically given in XML. For instance, WSDL (Web Service Description 
Language) files contain information about a Web service, its operations and endpoints 
as well as requests and responses.  
For each source, an adaptor has to be developed that realises a mapping from the 
source information to the subject matter ontology. Adaptors have to be designed such 
that they only extract relevant information. For example, the code of the person 
locator app features a programming variable, called FBID,  of  type  
xsd:FacebookAccount, which contains the Facebook ID at runtime. 
                                               
13 S Bassil and R Keller, “Software Visualization Tools: Survey and Analysis” in 9th International 
Workshop on Program Comprehension (IWPC 2001), 12-13 May 2001, Toronto, Canada (IEEE 
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4.2.2. Representing Unknown Instances 
Not all information can be extracted and is actually known during the design time of 
the software. In this case, proxy instances are put in place that have to be resolved by 
the developer during the legal reasoning process (see Section 5).  
 
 
Figure 8: Representation of the variable FBID with unknown information. 
 
An example is depicted in Figure 8. We can see that Data is  a  specialisation  of  
Information Object in the foundational ontology and the variable FBID is  an 
instance of Data. The class Information Object is associated with an 
ontology design pattern of the same name, prescribing the depicted relations to the 
remaining (grey) classes in the figure. An automatic extraction from the code can only 
yield FBID’s DataType, however. For all remaining relations, proxy instances have 
to  be  put  in  place  (identified  by  a  common  naming  scheme:  ?<class>_ 
<instance>?). 
 
4.2.3. Representing Default Knowledge as Instances 
Some information is known in advance depending on the context of our approach. 
This information is exploited and represented as instances in the subject matter 
ontology. Simple examples are the user and provider of the software.  Both roles are 
always present and result in default instances !User! (of class Natural Person) 
and !Provider! (of class Organisation), respectively. 
A more sophisticated example is the software context. In our scenario, we deal with 
mobile apps and corresponding operating systems. Such operating systems typically 
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prompt the user to “accept” certain permissions before installing an app. For example, 
the user is asked whether the app is allowed to transmit the coarse- (network based) or 
fine-grained (GPS) location of the device. The click on the “accept and download” 
button, therefore, is a default that happens before using the app. A corresponding 
default instance !Click_Accept! (of class Click) is added to the subject matter 
ontology, correspondingly. 
5. Semi-automated Legal Reasoning 
Formalising the norm graph, as well as the subject matter, is the prerequisite for 
(semi-)automating the legal reasoning process. The semi-automation of the legal 
reasoning process happens within an integrated software development environment 
based on a given software. This process essentially finds correspondences between the 
subject matter and one or more statutory ontologies and requires the interaction with 
the developer. 
Information of the software to be analysed is represented by a set I of instances in the 
subject matter ontology. These instances are automatically extracted from the source 
code as described in Section 4.2. Semi-automated legal reasoning transfers the 
instances to a statutory ontology, i.e., subsumes them under corresponding classes. 
For example, the instance WSOpI1 of class Web Service Operation 
Invocation in the subject matter ontology corresponds to the class Transfer in 
the data privacy ontology for private bodies. In this case, WSOpI1 must be subsumed 
under, i.e. become an instance of, Transfer as well. 
In the following we present a subsumption algorithm that relieves the developer as 
much as possible from finding such correspondences. The algorithm starts with the 
question for applicability of a specific statutory provision (see Question 1 in Section 
2.2). This question is reduced to a selection box where the developer can choose a 
statutory ontology for a specific field of law, e.g., the data privacy ontology for 
private bodies, or for public bodies, etc. 
Depending on the chosen field of law, the developer is prompted to select one, 
several, or all desired legal consequences. In the data privacy ontology for private 
bodies, legal consequences are lawfulness as  well  as  the  obligations  of  the  data  
controller defined by the FDPA. Each legal consequence is associated with a norm 
graph, e.g., the norm graph for lawfulness sketched in Figure 1. Consequently, the 
algorithm  tries  to  subsume  the  subject  matter  under  the  nodes  of  the  chosen  norm  
graph. 
The five process steps in Figure 9 (each of them further explained in Sections 5.1 to 
5.5) have to be executed for each legal concept LC at  the bottom of the norm graph, 
i.e., ones which are not further decomposed. Whether legal concepts above LC are 
given can be automatically inferred (further discussed in Section 6).  
 




Figure 9: Subsumption algorithm. The steps of 5.3 Concretisation, 5.4. Completing Subjective 
Relations and 5.5. Guided Interpretation require the interaction of the developer. 
 
Besides I and LC, another input to the algorithm is LC’s  set  of  relations  R.  For  
Personal Data, R consists of the following relations and accompanying target classes: 
expressesDirectly Identity, expressesIndirectly Identity, 
about Natural Person (according to the right side of Figure 5). 
In each process step of the algorithm, the set I of all instances of the subject matter 
ontology is reduced to a result set containing potential candidates for subsumption 
under the current legal concept LC.  As soon as the result  set  is  empty, the algorithm 
can terminate since no subsumable instance exists. If all steps are executed and I 
remains not empty, its instances are transferred to the corresponding statutory 
ontology.  
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5.1. Direct Query 
The first step tries to query directly for “all instances of class X in the subject matter 
ontology” where X depends on the following cases: 
Case  1  –  Preliminary  Check: Our approach allows to establish general 
correspondences between a class in a statutory ontology and a class C in the subject 
matter ontology. For instance, C might be the class User or Provider whose 
instances always correspond to Data Subject and Data Controller in the 
data privacy ontology for private bodies. If such a correspondence is present for the 
current legal concept LC, the subject matter ontology can be queried directly for 
instances of C(i.e., X = C). 
Case 2 – LC is part of the common foundational ontology: There might be general 
concepts that are contained in the foundational ontology, and, thus, are valid in both a 
statutory  and  the  subject  matter  ontology.  An  example  for  such  a  concept  is  
Natural Person (see Figure 4 and Figure 6). In this case, the subject matter 
ontology can be directly queried for the legal concept, i.e., X = LC. 
Case  3  –  LC is part of the subject matter ontology: A legal concept might be a 
terminus technicus. For example, the Telemedia Act might talk of “IP addresses”  
which is also a class in the subject matter ontology. In this case, the subject matter 
ontology can be directly queried for the legal concept, i.e., X = LC. 
Case 4 - LC features relations that are contained in the subject matter ontology: 
Although LC might not be part of the subject matter ontology, all the relations of LC 
might point to classes contained in the subject matter ontology. In this case, the query 
is constructed out of all instances that feature the corresponding relations independent 
of a specific class. 
If none of the cases applies, the algorithm continues with the step 5.2. Relaxed Query. 
In case the query yields an empty result set, the algorithm can be terminated for the 
current legal concept LC,  i.e.,  no  subsumption  is  possible.  Otherwise  the  algorithm  
continues with steps 5.4. Completing Subjective Relations and 5.5. Guided 
Interpretation, respectively. 
5.2. Relaxed Query 
As soon as at least one relation of the current legal concept LC is  neither part  of the 
foundational nor the subject matter ontology, a direct query is not possible. Instead, 
the query constructed in 5.1 must be relaxed, i.e., classes and relations are generalised 
to their respective superclasses and –relations in the foundational ontology.  
In our running example, Personal Data is  relaxed  to  its  superclass  
Information Object (see Figure 5). Its relation about Natural Person is 
relaxed to about Entity,  correspondingly.  A  query  for  “all  instances  of  
Information Object that are about an Entity” yields a result set that 
contains FBID of  Figure  8,  since  it  is  an  instanceOf Data which  is  also  an  
Information Object. 
Because of the generalisation, a non-empty query result might contain instances that 
do not classify as personal data.  These must be manually selected by the user in the 
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subsequent step 5.3 Concretisation.  If  the  query  result  is  empty,  there  are  no  
subsumable instances and the algorithm can be terminated for the current legal 
concept LC. 
5.3 Concretisation 
This step iterates over all generalised relations and prompts the developer to 
concretise each relation for every instance in the result set. This is supported by a 
wizard as depicted in Figure 10 where the left side represents the legal concept and 
current relation and the right side represents the current instance.  
In the example, the about Natural Person relation of Personal Data has 
been relaxed to about Entity. The corresponding query in the previous step 
yielded the instance FBID as a result. The context of FBID can be seen in the right 
side of Figure 10. Consequently, the wizard asks the developer whether FBID might 
be about a Natural Person and even lets him choose concrete instances of 
Natural Person (the default instance !User! in this particular case). The 
developer answers the question with “yes” since he is aware that FBID is  a  
programming variable that represents a Facebook ID at runtime.  
 
 
Figure 10: User interface design for step concretisation. 
 
If this step ends with an empty result of instances, the algorithm can be terminated for 
the current legal concept LC. Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds with completing 
subjective relations in the subsequent steps. 
5.4. Completing Subjective Relations 
Subjective relations rely on perception and require information about subjective or 
personal attitudes which are not accessible to another person. In our approach, legal 
concepts which cannot be formalised, such as whether a person is identified by a 
given data, are also treated as subjective.  





Figure 11: User interface design for step completing subjective relations. 
 
Accordingly, this step iterates over all subjective relations and all instances of the 
result set. The step requires the interaction of the developer via a wizard (see Figure 
11).  The  left  side  of  the  wizard  displays  a  graphical  rendition  of  the  current  legal  
concept LC where the subjective relation is highlighted with accompanying 
explanations. As an example, the relation expressesDirectly Identity of 
Personal Data is classified as being subjective in the scenario. The right side 
shows an instance of the current result set, e.g., the programming variable FBID 
introduced in Section 4.2.2. The developer has to decide if the subjective relation is 
given for every instance on the basis of the provided information. In the example, 
FBID represents the Facebook ID and the developer knows that such an ID often 
reflects the name of a natural person. Consequently, the developer positively answers 
the corresponding question of the wizard. 
In case of an empty result set after the iteration, the algorithm can be terminated for 
the current legal concept LC. Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds with step 5.5. Guided 
Interpretation. 
 
5.5. Guided Interpretation 
When legal experts interpret a statute, their approach is usually eclectic: they first try 
to interpret the statutory text of the relevant legal concept and norm, respectively.  If  
this interpretation yields ambiguities or uncertainties, the legislative context, history, 
and purpose have to be consulted for a resolution.14 The legislative context considers 
                                               
14 Statutory interpretation in Civil Law jurisdictions, e.g., Germany, follows a defined procedure, see K 
Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 6th ed (Berlin Heidelberg New York: Springer, 1991) 
at 313. An explanation for the less strict but comparable procedure in Common Law jurisdictions can 
be found in W Eskridge and P Frickey, “Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning” (1990) 42 
Stanford Law Review 321-384. 
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associated legal concepts and norms such that the interpretation is coherent altogether. 
The legislative history considers interpretations of the evolution of the statutory text 
over time and its original intention. Finally, the legislative purpose considers the 
intended overall legal policy of the corresponding provision. 
The steps so far dealt with relations that can be interpreted by considering the 
statutory text only. In the following, we present a wizard that guides the developer in 
dealing with ambiguous or uncertain relations that require additional interpretation. 
An automated processing of such relations is not possible since the required material 
for further statutory interpretation (legislative context, history, and purpose) is not 
available in machine understandable form.  
Suppose the current legal concept LC is Consent. Then, an example for a relation 
that requires additional interpretation is basedOn FreeDecision. Although 
mentioned in Sec. 4a (1) of the FDPA, free decision is  not  further  defined  in  the  
FDPA leaving room for a very broad interpretation.  
[Sec 4a (1) FDPA – Effective Consent: Consent shall be effective 
only when based on the data subject’s free decision. …] 
The wizard first presents material and sources for the legislative purpose, history and 
context of the legal concept or norm. Such material and sources have been provided 
by the legal expert when building the lexicon (see Section 3.1.2). Consequently, the 
developer selects material and sources that speak in favor of (pro) or against (con) a 
subsumption via checkboxes.  
Suppose the current instance represents a click on “accept and download” - a consent 
required by the operating system of the smart phone before installing and using the 
person locator app (see default instance !Click_Accept! in Section 4.2.3). 
Accordingly, the wizard lists Sec. 28 (3b) S.1 of the FDPA, Sec. 95 (5) of the TCA, 
and Sec. 12 (3) of the TMA (old version). These provisions express that dependency 
between consent and conclusion of a contract can indeed restrict the data subject’s 
freedom of decision.  
However, the wizard also lists further material that speaks in favor of 
!Click_Accept! being a “free decision.” One example is legislative background 
documents deciding against strict prohibition of binding consent to the conclusion of 
contracts. Instead, such dependencies are only explicitly forbidden for advertisement 
and address trading by Sec. 28 (3, 3b) S.1 of the FDPA. Even in these cases, freedom 
of decision is only restricted when there is no access to equivalent contractual 
benefits. A court decision found “equivalent alternatives” to be available even for a 
company with an extremely high market share.   




Figure 12 : User interface design for step “guided interpretation.” 
 
After selection, the wizard displays a dialogue for an overall interpretation (see Figure 
12). The dialogue displays the current legal concept, relation and instance, as well as 
the selected materials and sources. The overall interpretation cannot be reduced to a 
binary “yes/no” decision since the materials and sources might contradict each other. 
Instead, the overall interpretation is adjusted by a slider with an underlying numerical 
value between -1 and +1. In the example, the developer positions the slider towards 
“Pro” because the majority of material and sources speak in favor of a subsumption. 
The slider values are interpreted as follows 
- Positive: Only when the slider value is above a configurable threshold 
(e.g., +0.5), the current relation is interpreted as given for the current 
instance. 
- Negative: If the slider value is under a configurable threshold (e.g.,  
-0.5), the current relation is interpreted as not given for the current 
instance. 
- Borderline: In all other cases, (e.g., value between -0.5 and +0.5), we 
have a borderline case. The developer must be prompted to either 
terminate  the  subsumption  algorithm with  uncertain  result  and/or  get  
advice from a legal expert. Otherwise, coherence to legal methodology 
is not given. 
After adjusting the slider, the developer can save the interpretation along an additional 
free text commentary, as well as the selected material and the numerical slider value.  
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This step ends the subsumption process for the current legal concept. All remaining 
instances of the result set now become instances of, i.e., are subsumed under, the 
current legal concept LC of the chosen statutory ontology. All manual decisions taken 
by the developer in steps 5.3 and 5.5 are logged for an offline analysis by the legal 
expert. The analysis might lead to optimisations of future runs of the subsumption 
algorithm, e.g., by establishing general correspondences (see preliminary check in 
step 5.1). 
6. Legal Advice 
Semi-automated legal reasoning determines which legal concepts are given based on 
the current software. For example, in our scenario, the legal concepts “processing,” 
“use” and “personal data” are given. However, the desired consequence of 
“Lawfulness” is  not given since both “Consent” and “Permission or Order by FDPA 
or other Act” are not given. The developer is advised of this situation by visualising 
and marking the norm graph with unknown, given, or not given states of affairs by a 
wizard (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: Design of a wizard showing the marked norm graph in our running example. A black 
node represents a “given” state of affairs; grey nodes are “unknown” and white nodes are “not 
given.” 
The developer may click on a node in the norm graph to further understand why it is 
marked as given, not given or unknown. If the developer clicks on the not given node 
“Sec. 4a Consent,” the wizard shows the corresponding legal norm in more detail. 
This subsequent view essentially depicts the corresponding formalised legal norm of 
the data privacy ontology for private bodies in a graphical way. 
The resulting user interface is shown in Figure 14 where the desired “Effectiveness” 
of a “Consent” is not given. Similar to the norm graph, the legal norm is also marked 
depending on whether a state of affairs is given, not given or unknown. Figure 14 also 
shows that, besides the graphical depiction, the norm text, sources and links to further 
information, are offered on additional tabs. This information has been provided by the 
legal expert when building the lexicon (see Section 3.1.2). 





Figure 14: Design of a wizard showing the marked legal norm for Sec 4a (1) FPDA (Effective 
Consent). 
 
Upon inspecting the graphical visualisation, the developer realises that the 
“Effectiveness” is not given because: a) it is unknown whether the requirements for 
“Electronic Form” are given and b) it is unknown whether the “Data Subject” has 
been properly “informedAbout” the “Necessary Information.” Subsequently, the 
developer clicks on either node to learn more about their current state. 
Figure 15 shows the user interface after clicking on “Electronic Form.” The developer 
is informed about requirements for electronic consent according to Sec. 13 (2) of the 
TMA. The corresponding view offers a visualisation of the legal concept as 
formalised in the data privacy ontology for private bodies. In addition, the view offers 
tabs for the concept’s definition, additional commentaries, or further information – all 
of which are part of the lexicon provided by the legal expert.   
The developer is informed that effectiveness requires the declaration of consent to be 
recorded and even versioned in the case of a Web application, i.e., Telemedia (Sec. 13 
(2) No 2, 3 of the TMA, Sec. 94 No 2, 3 of the TCA). It is now upon the developer to 
realise this requirement in the software. The developer continues by clicking on 
“Fulfill” what leads to an update of the corresponding instance in the ontology. The 
developer might navigate back to the norm or norm graph view by using the 
navigation bar on the left to see what has changed. For instance, “Consent” (see 
Figure 14) is now given but not “Effectiveness” since the user is not properly 
informed about the “Necessary Information” of processing personal data. Hence, the 
developer might click on “Necessary Information” to learn how this state of affairs 
can be fulfilled and so on. The developer continues until “Lawfulness” in the norm 
graph view (see Figure 13) is given. 
 




Figure 15 : Design of a wizard showing further information for Sec 13 (2) TMA (Electronic 
Form).  
 
7. Proof of Concept 
The  main  bottleneck  of  our  approach  is  the  formalisation  of  the  norm  graph.  We  
expect a legal expert to formalise legal concepts, as well as the rule-like nature of 
legal norms and their relationships, in one or more statutory ontologies. This requires 
a major intellectual effort, so that the legal expert has to be supported as efficiently as 
possible and the correctness of modeling has to be ensured. Thus, the following 
questions have to be addressed: 
(i) Is the proposed automatic extraction of legal concepts really useful? 
(ii) Is the ontology language expressive enough for capturing legal concepts 
and norms? 
(iii) Is the legal expert capable of modeling an ontology? 
(iv) Do formalised concepts and norms really capture the semantics of the 
provisions? 
With respect to (i), the automatic pre-processing proposed in Section 3.1.1 has been 
realised and applied to the German FDPA.15 The FDPA contains 16669 words overall. 
The first step of automatic pre-processing allowed a reduction to 2291 words by 
singling out duplicates. The second step reduced this initial word list of 2291 words to 
1556 candidates for modeling. 31% of the words were reduced through stemming 
(17.9%) and stop words (13.3%) as can be seen in Figure 16. There were 698 words 
with common stem which in turn have been reduced to 287 word stems. This resulted 
                                               
15  For a detailed discussion please refer to U Reppel, Computergestützte Extraktion 
modellierungsrelevanter Rechtsbegriffe aus Gesetzestexten am Beispiel des BDSG (Karlsruhe: 
Bachelor thesis, Karlsruhe Institute for Technology (KIT), Department of Informatics, 2010). 
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in 411 words removable by stem. There were an additional 21 removable other words 
what  resulted  in  an  overall  736  words  that  could  be  eliminated  as  not  relevant  for  
modeling. Concluding, the word count for modeling candidates has been reduced 
significantly and lowered the initial modeling effort for the legal expert. 
 
Figure 16: Summary of the results for automatic pre-processing of the German FDPA. 
 
Regarding (ii), our work found that exceptions require special workarounds in the 
target language.16 We classified legal norms according to their syntactic structure and 
derived representation requirements. Based on the requirements we have chosen the 
target language and ensured that each category can be properly represented. 
With respect to (iii), our proof of concept comprised mock-ups for potential graphical 
user interfaces. One mock-up is shown in Figure 5, further ones are contained and 
documented in our prior work.17 First experiences indeed have shown that the legal 
expert has to have basic knowledge in ontological modeling. The design of a proper 
graphical user interface requires experts in visualisation of law and is left as future 
work. 
In order to ensure a semantically correct modeling (iv) we have designed a test case 
editor for the legal expert.18 The editor allows defining test cases and comparing the 
automated legal reasoning with the manual legal reasoning result for specific legal 
concepts and rules. In case of deviations, the legal expert is supported in correcting  
the formalized legal concept or norm. 
Besides the bottleneck of formalising statutory provisions, the following questions 
require a discussion: 
(v) Does the automated legal reasoning provide correct results? 
(vi) Is the advice for the developer presented properly? 
                                               
16 O  Raabe,  R  Wacker,  D  Oberle,  C  Baumann  and  C  Funk,  Recht ex machina (Heidelberg: Springer 
Vieweg, 2012) at ch 13, 14. 
17 Ibid, sec 19.1 – 19.4. 










 (2012) 9:3 SCRIPT-ed 
 
309
With respect to (v), the main goal of this work is to provide decision support for the 
developer. Advices for achieving lawfulness represent a benefit since manual legal 
reasoning  can  often  not  be  sought  due  to  lack  of  a  legal  expert,  high  costs  and  time 
consumption. In order to be methodologically sound, our approach indeed aborts 
explicitly when no clear result can be obtained (e.g., during guided interpretation in 
Section 5.5) and advises to consult a legal expert.  
In general, the prerequisite for correct results is a correct formalisation of the statutory 
provisions. This is ensured by the test case editor as we have learned above. However, 
errors in representing the subject matter, the automatic extraction of instances, and the 
subsumption algorithm can occur. Errors can be due to bugs in the realisation or due 
to wrong interactions of the developer during subsumption. In this case, wrong results 
would indeed be produced. Note, however, that the manual legal reasoning process 
and advice is also error-prone. One reason is that the developer has to communicate 
and explain the subject matter to the legal expert. Many misinterpretations usually 
occur during this process. The developer has to describe any information in natural 
language using terms a legal expert can understand. An alternative for consulting a 
legal expert is handbooks for developers that cover legal aspects. In contrast to our 
approach, such handbooks are often not up-to-date, the information is not case-
specifically offered (has to be found first), and might not match the developer’s needs.  
With respect to (vi), our proof of concept comprised mock-ups for potential graphical 
user interfaces. Several mock-ups are shown in Section 6, further ones are contained 
and documented in our prior work.19 The design of a proper graphical user interface 
requires more controlled experiments with a significant number of developers and is 
left as future work. 
8. Related Work 
Related work can be grouped in approaches that tackle formalisation of legal norms, 
formalisation of legal concepts, or automated legal reasoning. To the best of our 
knowledge there is no single approach that combines all three features for the purpose 
of engineering compliant software. Each of the groups will be discussed and 
positioned in the following subsections. 
8.1. Formalisation of Legal Norms 
The first group of related approaches analyses how and to what degree the rule-like 
structure of legal norms can be formalised and the required expressiveness of the 
formal language. Table 1 positions our approach to related work according to the 
following criteria: 
 Focus on Statutory Provisions: The approach formalises statutory provisions 
(including legal concepts and norms) and not other directives, e.g., IT policies 
or general terms in the realm of law. 
 Legal Methodology: The approach considers legal methodology and maintains 
the original structure of the norms. 
                                               
19 Ibid, ch 18, 21. 
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 Practicability: The approach is geared at a running system and not limited to 
pure theoretical discussions. 
 Generality: The approach is usable for statutory provisions in any field of law. 
 
Table 1 : Approaches that tackle the formalisation of legal norms. 





Methodology Practicability Generality 
McCarty20 -    
Kowalski21    - 
Sartor22   - - 
Gordon23    - 
Ringelstein24 - -  - 
Prior work25    - 
This work     
8.2. Formalisation of Legal Concepts 
The second group of related approaches focuses on the formalisation of legal concepts 
or special legal knowledge. Most approaches apply ontologies to capture the intended 
meaning of concepts but do not consider the formalisation of the subject matter. 
However, the latter is of importance for semi-automation of the legal reasoning 
process (see approaches in Section 8.3). Table 2 positions our approach to related 
work according to the following criteria: 
                                               
20  L McCarty, “A Language for Legal Discourse I: Basic Features” in Proceedings of the 2nd 
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL '89) (New York, NY, USA: ACM, 
1989) 180–189. 
21 R Kowalski, “Legislation as Logic Programs” in G Comyn, N Fuchs and M Ratcliffe (eds) Logic 
Programming in Action, Second International Logic Programming Summer School, LPSS ’92, Zurich, 
Switzerland, September 7-11, 1992, Proceedings (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 1992) 203–230. 
22 R Marín and G Sartor, “Time and Norms: A Formalisation in the Event-calculus” in Proceedings of 
the 7th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL ’99) (New York, NY, USA: 
ACM, 1999) 90-99; A Artosi, G Governatori and G Sartor, “Towards a Computational Treatment of 
Deontic Defeasibility” in M Brown and J Carmo (eds), Deontic Logic Agency and Normative Systems 
(New York: Springer, 1995) 27-46; G Sartor, “The Structure of Norm Conditions and nonmonotonic 
Reasoning in Law” in Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Artificial intelligence and 
law (ICAIL ’91) (New York, NY, USA: ACM, 1991) 155-164. 
23 T Gordon, “Oblog-2: A Hybrid Knowledge Representation System for Defeasible Reasoning” in 
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL ’87) (New 
York, NY, USA: ACM, 1987) 231–239; T Gordon, „Constructing Arguments with a Computational 
Model of an Argumentation Scheme for Legal Rules: Interpreting Legal Rules as Reasoning Policies“ 
in Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL 2007) 
(New York, NY, USA: ACM 2007) 117–121. 
24 C Ringelstein and S Staab, “Papel: Provenance-Aware Policy Definition and Execution” (2011) 
15(1) IEEE Internet Computing 49–58. 
25 A Dietrich, P Lockemann and O Raabe: “Agent Approach to Online Legal Trade” in J Krogstie, A 
Opdahl and S Brinkkemper (eds), Conceptual Modelling in Information Systems Engineering (Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2007) 177-194. 
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 Legal Methodology: The approach considers common legal procedures in the 
interpretation of legal concepts and fosters traceability and reproducibility. 
 Subject Matter: The approach also considers the formalisation of the subject 
matter for semi-automation of the subsumption process. 
 Foundational Ontology: The approach applies ontological analysis supported 
by a foundational ontology as starting point.  
 Design Patterns: The approach applies ontology design patterns as best 
practices for re-occurring modelling needs. 
 Quality Criteria: The approach relies on ontological quality criteria for optimal 
design of the ontology. 
 
Table 2 : Approaches that tackle the formalisation of legal concepts. 












Valente26  - - - - 
Van Kralingen27  - - - - 
Hoekstra28  -    
Schweighofer29  -    
Visser30   -  - 
Gangemi31 -    - 
Saias32 -   - - 
This work      
8.3. Automated Legal Reasoning 
The third group of related approaches focuses on the automation of legal reasoning as 
a whole. There are diverse approaches resting on different technologies, e.g., case-
                                               
26  A  Valente  and  J  Breuker,  “A  functional  ontology  of  law”  in  G  Bargellini  and  S  Binazzi  (eds) 
Towards a Global Expert System in Law (Padua: CEDAM Publishers, 1994) 201-212. 
27 R van Kralingen, “A Conceptual Frame-based Ontology for the Law” in Proceedings of the First 
International Workshop on Legal Ontologies (1997) 15–22. 
28 R Hoekstra et al, “The LKIF Core Ontology of Basic Legal Concepts” in P Casanovas, M Biasiotti, 
E Francesconi and M Sagri (eds), Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Legal Ontologies and Artificial 
Intelligence Techniques (CEUR, 2008) 43–63. 
29 E Schweighofer, “Semantic Indexing of Legal Documents” in E Francesconi et al (eds), Semantic 
Processing of Legal Texts (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2010) 157–169. 
30  P  Visser,  R  van  Kralingen  and  T  Bench-Capon,  “A  Method  for  the  Development  of  Legal  
Knowledge Systems” in Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and 
Law (ICAIL ’97) (New York, NY, USA: ACM, 1999) 151–160. 
31 A Gangemi, “Introducing Pattern-based Design for Legal Ontologies“ in J Breuker et al (eds), Law, 
Ontologies and the Semantic Web - Channelling the Legal Information Flood (IOS Press, 2009) 53–71. 
32 J Saias and P Quaresma, “A Methodology to Create Legal Ontologies in a Logic Programming 
Information Retrieval System” in V Benjamins et al (eds), Law and the Semantic Web (Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2005) 185–200. 
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based reasoning or artificial neural networks. Table 3 positions our approach to 
related work according to the following criteria: 
 Civil Law: Our approach is based on the continental European civil law 
system. Considering the differences to Common Law would require 
adaptations. 
 Legal Methodology: The approach does not rest on probabilistic technologies, 
such as artificial neural networks, or fuzzy logic. While automated legal 
reasoning might be possible, it would not adhere to the strict reproducibility of 
statutory interpretation in Civil Law jurisdictions. 
 Generalisation: The approach is not geared at a specific legal norm or 
provision, but can be applied generically. 
 Layman Support: The approach provides intuitive support for semi-automated 
legal reasoning and the advice for the developer. 
 
Table 3 : Approaches that tackle the automation of legal reasoning. 
          Criterion 
Approach Civil Law 
Legal 
Methodology Generality Layman Support 
Bench-Capon33 -   - 
Gordon34   - - 
Philipps35 - -  - 
Bohrer36   - - 
Ring37   - - 
Prior Work38   - - 
This work     
9. Conclusion 
This paper presented an approach for engineering compliant software consisting of a 
subject matter ontology, a statutory ontology, the user-guided subsumption between 
both, and the realisation of consequences. The approach supports software developers 
in achieving legal compliance by design as a reaction to increasingly decentralised 
and dynamically combined software components. 
                                               
33 T Bench-Capon and G Sartor, “A Model of Legal Reasoning with Cases Incorporating Theories and 
Values” (2003) 150 (1-2) Artificial Intelligence 97–143. 
34 There is an inference system for the formal language Oblog already referenced in Section 8.1. 
35  L Philipps and G Sartor, “Introduction: From Legal Theories to Neural Networks and Fuzzy 
Reasoning” (1999) 7(2-3) Artificial Intelligence and Law 115–128. 
36  A Bohrer, Entwicklung eines internetgestützten Expertensystems zur Prüfung des Anwendungs-
bereichs urheberrechtlicher Abkommen (Kassel: University Press, 2003). 
37  S Ring, Computergestützte Rechtsfindungssysteme, Voraussetzungen, Grenzen und Perspektiven, 
(Köln, Berlin, Bonn, München: Heymanns, 1994). 
38 M Conrad et al, “Legal Compliance by Design: Technical Solutions for Future Distributed Electronic 
Markets”  (2010) 21(3) Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing 321–333. 
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Future work will apply the same principles to software execution. Major differences 
to the engineering phase are:  (i)  less information is unknown and (ii)  the duration of 
the user-guided legal reasoning process is more critical.  
Further future work concerns the generalisation of the approach to other legal 
frameworks. The approach can in principle be applied to other legal frameworks, e.g., 
other domains such as the German Energy Industry Act, or other jurisdictions such as 
the Anglo-American case law. We also plan to consider contractual agreements, such 
as general terms and conditions. 
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